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Resilience of a body in general describes the ability to cope with an attack on its
immune system. What is undisputed in psychology or biology is also valid for legal
bodies, in particular for states. The term “constitutional resilience” obviously refers to
the abilities of constitutions to cope with attacks and in the end to cope with a real
crisis.
The workshop is going to analyze in particular the situation in two States where
considerable changes in democracy and the rule of law have occurred during the last
three to ten years, Hungary and Poland. It is focusing on six fields of constitutional law,
represented by three panels with two sessions each. My contribution aims at
contributing to some of these fields, in particular Constitutional justice. It is based on
the experience of the Venice Commission for which I have been working for more than
a decade. During the past seven years the Venice Commission adopted no less than
nine opinions on constitutional and related reforms of the judiciary, six on Hungary,
three on Poland. There are some more if one takes other opinions on particular
fundamental rights into account, I mention the one on religious communities or most
recently on the “Stop Soros”-legislation, the consequences of which can be felt in
Berlin. In the course of these proceedings the Venice Commission visited both
countries several times. The Rapporteurs spoke to Heads of States, Ministers,
Parliamentarians, judges, journalists and other organs such as the Judicial Council or
the ombudsman and NGOs. In doing so, external experts get a good impression on the
“state of a state” – vom Zustand eines Staates.
In my view, resilience is subject to at least two factors: First, how stable is the system?
And second, how aggressive is its surrounding?
In searching for resilience I would like to formulate three questions which guide my
thoughts on the issue und which may also be somehow relevant for the whole
conference:
1. Where are the vulnerable parts of a democratic state governed by the rule of
law?
2. How can one protect the vulnerability of the state or some of its features?
3. If vulnerable parts of a Constitution are properly protected – are the democratic
state and its constitution safe?
In order to give at least partial answers, I would like to proceed in three steps. I am
going to start with remarks on methodology and practice. Second, I am going to deal
with vulnerability of constitutional courts. This is followed by some observations on
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consequences for dealing with the issue of resilience, in particular with a view to
constitutional justice.
II. Remarks on methods and practice
Methods: The establishment of European standards
    a. Discussion from outside: the problem of language and other problems
The first issue we have to bear in mind in the discussion of certain constitutional
developments is the potential lack of legal know-how and language. In particular
where a language is less accessible for foreigners (like Hungarian) one has to work
with translations as far as they are accessible. Therefore, outsiders have to be careful
in listening to various sides of the conflict. Sometimes even a majority violating many
standards may have a point – for instance, this applied to the former majority in the
Polish Sejm when it tried to influence future nominations of judges.
This is of course not new, in particular not for the Venice Commission. The Commission
helps itself by having interviews with all sides in a conflict, Government and
opposition, the judiciary, media, and NGOs, including GONGOs. In doing this, one gets
a fuller picture. For academics and judges this picture is completed by conferences and
bilateral and multilateral meetings among judges. International contacts dating back to
former times when the crisis has not yet started help to gain common ground in the
evaluation of the current situation.
    b. Cherry picking in systematic comparison
In discussions with Hungarian and Polish Government representatives one can
frequently hear counter examples from older democracies of the continent. Single
procedural features are mentioned and isolated from their context in order to
legitimize the interference with the independence of justice. I would like to mention
just one significant example: When the two-third majority requirement for the
annulment of laws was introduced, the Polish Government referred to a similar
requirement in party prohibition proceedings in Germany (and it was even argued that
– due to the number of eight judges in a Senate of the BVerfG – it was in fact a three-
quarter majority requirement). Another argument is what one could call the “zero
solution”-argument; i.e. reference to European states without constitutional courts
following the German-Austrian model. In an opposite sense, one can also hear the
argument with regard to the invocatio dei and the length of the preamble of a
constitution, with religious communities, etc. The answer to this is in all cases the
same: Comparison always has to take into account the overall context. The role of
constitutional justice has been different in the formerly so-called democracies to the
role of the ordinary judiciary or parliament exercising similar functions in the UK,
Sweden or Finland. In Germany and Austria, constitutional justice has been a means of
stabilizing the democratic state after non-democratic regimes have come to an end.
Here the situation was more similar to the countries which overcame communist
dictatorship at the beginning of the 1990ies.
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Another example of selective comparison with a view to Hungary concerns cardinal
laws (also known in similar forms in France under “loi organique”), an instrument that
has existed for a long time in Hungary but which was excessively used only after 2010.
    c. What are European standards in the field of rule of law?
It is against this background that my third methodological remark is formulated. I
would like to comment on the proper approach, in a way it is the question of the
proper and adequate methodology to analyze systems in transition from a European
perspective.
In reflecting the methodology of establishing European standards I take as a starting
point the experience of the Venice Commission. The quality of opinions as non-binding
recommendations encourages the continued development of existing standards. The
purpose is not only the creation of minimum requirements, but rather the
achievement of "best practice". In this context one has to refer to a certain variety of
members, on one side the "judicial" members, thinking rather "legally", and on the
other side politically thinking members, who look at legislation with a political
background with the perspective of shaping the law.
Altogether the process of preparing an opinion is a cooperative work of protagonists
with different qualities, in particular specialists in the field of European constitutional
law, who are not primarily guided by formal rules of procedure, but rather by tacit
consensus and – meanwhile – decade-long practice. Due to time pressure and
awareness of the non-commitment of the documents the wordings are not always as
accurately chosen and discussed as it is frequently the case in constitutional or highest
courts. The special value lies within the common European perspective, in the
influence of different standards and in the fact that other organs can build upon them,
whether courts or political organs. The principle of a dialogical trial should be
emphasized as a general characteristic.
Like the judges of the European Court of Human Right (ECtHR) the members of the
Venice Commission are guided by the idea of a common European constitutional
heritage, as it was the vision of the governments of the member states (at least at the
time of the foundation of the Council of Europe), taking seriously the last part of the
preamble of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights referring to
governments of states "which are like-minded and have a common heritage of political
traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law." Mutual references in opinions, studies
and decisions increase cohesion, awareness of multilateral support in the
maintenance and development of democratic, rule of law and – last but not least –
standards of human rights.
As some of you know the Venice Commission has not only adopted a number of
opinions on Hungary and Poland but also a “Rule of Law Checklist”. This checklist
covers all important issues to be respected in order to establish what we are used to
calling “a democratic state governed by the rule of law.” In its main part it puts into
question so-called benchmarks, such as supremacy of law, legal certainty, equality or
access to justice.
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A checklist has advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it seems to be easy in
application, as you have to tick boxes. On the other hand, checklists do not show the
problems between the lines. There may be serious problems even if all or nearly all
criteria are fulfilled. On the other hand, a state does not necessarily fall short of
European standards if it does not show a certain feature.
Therefore, the Venice Commission is not limited to putting questions. It also explains
how the criteria should be applied and refers to the “specific national context” when it
comes to the application of a certain criterion. In short: Checklists may help, however,
they must not replace a synthetic approach.
    d. Practice: The factor “time”
Time is an important issue when it comes to resilience. Experience with governments
aiming at radical changes in a democratic system shows that these bodies proceed
with remarkable speed when it comes to legislative acts or even to the election of
judges. Chronologies in Venice Commission opinions show this very clearly.
Governments push laws through Parliament within days, opposition parties do not
have enough time for studying the law, the role of Parliament to discuss laws is to a
large extent neglected, public debate is cut off by speed. As to election of judges, the
most remarkable example is the taking of the oath of some new judges of the
Constitutional Court in the middle of a December night.
What we can see here is that state organs enjoy different possibilities to speed up in
certain situations. While opposition in Parliament is already in a position of
disadvantage vis-à-vis the executive, the situation of the judiciary and constitutional
courts is even worse as far as time is concerned. Judicial proceedings call for strict
procedural guarantees, exchange of views among the collegiate body and a well-
written reasoning, in particular in situations of crisis. The power of the argument and
convincing with its reasoning, not speed, is the currency with which the judicial power
deals.
As to European bodies, their time of reaction is even longer, although they are – with
two exceptions – non-judicial organs. The judicial organs are the Strasbourg and
Luxemburg Courts, which need applications under Article 34 ECHR or references under
Article 267 TFEU, which they only get after some time has lapsed. In the European
Union, the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament need months and
years in order to come to a decision even to introduce proceedings, the Commission
still being the most flexible organ among these three.
An exception is the Venice Commission which has established working methods that
enable it to adopt opinions sometimes within weeks, regularly within two months. This
aspect forms – together with the know-how and the reputation of its members – a
reason for its success and its relevance for decisions of other European bodies.
Another time issue I can only address in questions is the following: In situations where
legal scholars discussing resilience are confronted with radical changes and the aim to
remove such changes the questions arise: How far can we turn back the wheel of
time? Do we have to accept certain decisions after a while as part of constitutional law
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although they were initially found illegal? These questions should be put on the agenda
of a workshop on resilience.
III. Vulnerability of constitutional justice: three
Achilles´ heels of constitutional Courts
Let me turn to the vulnerability of constitutional justice. I would like to discuss the
vulnerability of courts by describing three Achilles´ heels: the nomination of judges,
targeted changes in procedural law, and the disrespect of decisions.
Composition of a court and election of judges
The first and most important means of interfering with the independence of a
constitutional court is the selection of its bench. If the election of judges has the
consequence that the majority in the Court is not willing or unable to exercise effective
control, the Court loses its functions in a state governed by the rule of law. The
examples of the Austrian Constitutional Court in the 1930s as well as the American
Supreme Court in the 19th century confirm this experience, long time before Franklin
D. Roosevelt intended to increase the number of justices in the SCOTUS to 15 in order
to avoid interference by judges with his “New Deal”.
There will be a special workshop on the issue, so it is not the task of the opening
session to give simple answers beforehand. Factors of resilience, which can be seen at
first sight, are whether there is a requirement for a qualified majority for the election
of judges, whether there are cooling-off-periods for politicians, whether there are strict
requirements concerning the qualifications and professional backgrounds and
whether there are provisions of incompatibility of offices.
What should be added at this early stage of the conference are two elements which
one immediately realizes when going deeper inside a system as an outsider.
The first element is the term of office of constitutional judges. As a general rule, terms
of office of judges in constitutional courts vary between five and twelve years. There a
few examples where the term goes beyond, Austria being one example. Arguments on
the length have been exchanged – it is basically on striking a balance between
democratic legitimacy and independence. In Poland and Hungary, it is nine years like in
other courts (including the European Court of Human Rights), in Hungary there is the
possibility of one re-election, which in fact does not contribute to more independence,
on the contrary.
An isolated analysis would come to the result that there is no problem with a 9 years-
term. However, in the concrete Polish situation, it was. The reason was the coincidence
of a larger number of vacancies at the Court. Simple mathematics explain the
situation. The Court has existed for less than 30 years, it consists of 15 judges with a
term of only nine years. One does not have to be an expert in statistics in order to
realize that it is likely that a majority of judges may be replaced in less than a legislative
period.
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In autumn 2015, the Polish Constitutional Court was particularly vulnerable because
the old majority had overstepped the legal lines of the constitutional election of
judges, which gave the new majority a pretext to take a similar step – crossing the line
of constitutionality.
The second aspect is whether opposition in Parliament or other intermediate powers
participate in the election process or whether it is the Government alone who elects
the judges. In its rule of law checklist the Venice Commission recommends a two-third
majority for the election of judges in Parliament, a model which exists in Germany. In
absence of such a rule constitutional practice may lead to a similar result. Austria has
been an example for this; in Germany, the consensus rule is completed by custom
even reaching beyond the two-third requirement in the two chambers of Parliament.
Another way is to distribute nomination between various organs, including organs of
the judiciary, Italy is an example for that.
Modification of procedural law
The second Achilles´ heel is procedural law. Again, we find examples in the Polish and
Hungarian experiences. The Polish Law amending the Act on the Constitutional
Tribunal of 22 December 2015 contained inter alia a sequence role, providing for a
quorum of presence and a qualified majority in certain proceedings. In combination
with the election of certain judges the measures were obviously directed to influence
the outcome of certain proceedings, in particular the examination of the amendments
to the Constitutional Act themselves.
In Hungary we face also a number of direct interventions in the procedural law
introduced by a series of legislative acts only short time after the Government has
reached the two-thirds majority in Parliament. Apart from procedural aspects two
different types of direct interference with the judicial activity of the Constitutional
Court exist:
(a) The first one concerns the direct curtailing of competencies of the Court. In this
context there was a lot of discussion on the abolition of actio popularis in Hungary. For
the purpose of this paper I would like to leave this issue aside; here the legislature has
reduced a legal situation that went far beyond normal European standards to a level
that corresponds in this respect roughly with the situation in Germany and is well
above the access to the Constitutional Court in Austria. A much more critical issue is
the limitation to review tax and budgetary legislation according to Article 37 para. 4 of
the Basic Law only with a view to some basic human rights[1], introduced in 2010 and
extended one year later.
(b) The second interference concerns the direct influence by introducing a rule of
interpretation. This happened in the case of Hungary. As a reaction to references of
the Constitutional Court to previous case law the Constitutional legislator tried to cut
continuity to previous case law established under the former Constitution.[2] If such a
step is successful it is a severe interference with the independence of constitutional
justice as it is aimed at directly influencing the process of interpretation of the
Constitution.Acceptance of decisions of constitutional courts by government
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The third Achilles´ heel concerns the acceptance of the Constitutional Court and its
case-law by Government.
Disrespect vis-à-vis constitutional justice can be seen at an early stage of proceedings.
It is a common feature that in norm control proceedings before a constitutional court
representatives of Government and/or Parliament take part in order to defend
legislative acts before the Court. As to the outcome of these proceedings, constitutions
usually provide for the publication of judgments concerning the annulment of laws (or
at least of its operative part) in the official journal where laws are published. This is
usually an obligation of the government concerned or of the prime minister.
In these reactions we can see clear disrespect of the constitutional court. If the validity
of the highest judicial instance of a State is not respected by Government and/or
Parliament, a constitutional crisis has reached its peak, or rather its deepest ground. In
Poland of 2016 we have seen how Government overtly disrespected the Constitutional
Tribunal and its decisions, Government did not participate in the proceedings on the
2015 Amendment to the Constitutional Tribunal Act and the decision of the
Constitutional Tribunal annulling the Amendment was declared null and void.
IV. Resilience of Constitutional Courts
Two different approaches to resilience
The design of this conference could lead us to the question: Which lesson do we learn
from Poland and Hungary? Among other lessons to be learned, the most important
one is the vulnerability of Constitutional Justice. We have seen in the case of Hungary
that a two-thirds majority can heavily deprive constitutional courts of vital elements. In
Poland we get an example where a simple majority in Parliament can do the same or
go even further.
A resilience discussion could lead us to vigilance towards the first signs of an
authoritarian, non-democratic regime and to preventive counter-measures – a so
called “Wehret-den-Anfängen”-approach, both on the level of constitutionalism and on
the level of the political debate.
Another, different approach – and in fact a probably more needed approach regarding
the countries affected by severe attacks on the independence of the judiciary – is
directed towards assisting those who engage in the debate and fight for certain
standards of the rule of law, democracy and human rights in their respective
constitutional orders.
If we accept this difference we might agree in the following comparison drawn from
medical science: For a healthy person a medical doctor would not prescribe treatment
with antibiotics, rather the doctor would recommend vitamins and nourishment that
strengthens the immune system while winter approaches. If the person faces an
imminent danger of serious diseases the doctor would recommend vaccinations. The
situation is different with a patient having fallen ill already. In this case medical
treatment in the narrower sense is required.
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Three steps to increase or support resilience
As many German colleagues might focus on the first approach during the next two
days I would try two introduce some ideas to the second approach – “the ill patient”-
approach. Such an approach includes – at least – three steps.
The first step is to decide whether it is an illness or a simple mutation of the rule of
law. In other words: the question is whether there is a threat to democracy and the
rule of law which is beyond a red line drawn by European Law and/or the national
Constitution. This has to be separated from other questions which might be called
“political questions” within the margin of appreciation of a state, hereby using a term
constantly used by the European Court of Human Rights.
The second step is to analyze the reaction by national organs and stake holders,
including universities and the civil society, in particular the media and their reactions
in the respective state. At this point I would like to be very concrete as someone who is
an outsider to the Hungarian and Polish constitutional debates understanding none of
the two languages.
To start with Poland: The Constitutional Tribunal, the Supreme Court and in particular
their (former) (Vice)Presidents have shown remarkable independence and courage.
There was strong resistance by the civil society and other stakeholders in the debate.
The judges of the Constitutional Tribunal went on adjudicating with an open dissent on
the composition of the bench, they declared the amendments on their procedural law
to a large extent unconstitutional, and they tried to prevent the new Court President
preferred by the Government from being elected. Apparently votes are not so clear so
the new President avoids sitting in the Plenary. Against the non-acceptance of
judgments the ordinary courts took the annulment of laws by the Constitutional
Tribunal into account although the decisions were not published. However, in the end
this did not lead to a situation where the Constitutional Tribunal could continue to
fulfill its task under the Constitution. Rather we have a nonfunctioning Court at the
moment, more or less isolated on an international level.
The situation is somehow different with the Hungarian Constitutional Court. The two-
third majority gave the Government much more room to maneuver, and they made
strong use of it. Illegalities, breaches of the constitution by the legislator or the Court
are not obvious (at least not in the same way as in Poland), the Court produces
decisions and, in some cases, also declares laws unconstitutional. However, the
effectiveness of the judicial control by the Court is put in question in Hungary, also by
some of the conveners of this conference. My suggestion would be to look closely at
decisions in a joint Hungarian-European analysis, where Hungarians and outsiders
should have the same aim, but different roles. The aim would be to find out whether
there are positive features that we may agree on at all. Can we find tendencies of
substantial case law or is there only lip service towards European standards while the
judges just approve what the Fidesz Government majority legislates? In that context I
would draw the attention to Zoltan Szentes´ analysis of the case law between 2010 and
2014 in Jahrbuch für Ostrecht 2014 without discussing his observations. More recent
examples of the case law and of dissenting opinions show that the Hungarian
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Constitutional Court has to a large extent withdrawn from an active role of a “negative
legislator” towards a Court that deals with a number of questions on a more formal
basis, frequently focusing on procedural requirements. However, the Court still is not a
uniform body although practically all current judges have been appointed under the
majority of the Fidesz Government. A few examples in the recent case law should show
this:
In a judgment on disciplinary proceedings against a judge sitting in insolvency
cases and allegedly having dealt with his cases too slowly, the Constitutional
Court annulled the sanctions on procedural grounds. It did not deal with the
allegation of the judge that the measure against him was a retaliatory measure
for his criticism against the judicial system in Hungary. In this context, one should
take note of a separate opinion of judge Czine (a career judge) who called for a
stronger consideration of independence of judges in disciplinary proceedings
against judges.
The increase in cardinal laws with a two-third majority-requirement in the years
after 2010 had the effect that future simple majorities in Parliament could not
depart so easily from legislative decisions taken by the first Fidesz Government.
However, this already hits the current Fidesz Government. According to Article P
of the Basic Law, legislation on the protection of national resources was subject
to cardinal laws. In two decisions of October 2017 the Constitutional Court found
that the legislator has not taken the proper form of cardinal law, setting a time
limit in which the legislation in the form of cardinal act has to be taken.
In the same decision it held that the provision of Article 37 para. 4 Basic Law
restricting the competences of the Court was to be interpreted narrowly, not
excluding the review on separation of agricultural land from the national land
fund.
A negative example in terms of quality of the reasoning is the decision on
political advertisement by Government in the campaign for the 2016 referendum
on “compulsory immigration of foreigners through the EU”. The question in the
proceedings was whether one-sided Government spots, calling for participation
in the referendum (“I love Hungary and therefore I go voting”), were to be
counted for the 50-minutes-limit for Government advertising, which did not
happen. The Curia (Supreme Court) gave a detailed reasoning why it found that
this “Government propaganda” was to be counted for the 50 minutes and did not
fall under “advertising in the public interest”. The Constitutional Court in turn
annulled this decision and found (in favor of the Government) that imposing the
50-minutes-limit violated the freedom of expression of the TV station concerned.
There is no substantial reasoning in the judgment and in particular no argument
against the reasoning of the curia. For the background it is remarkable that the
rapporteur was Maria Szivos who was one of the four judges elected when the
size of the Court was increased from 11 to 15. And even more remarkable is the
fact that a separate opinion of four judges criticizes that the Constitutional Court
did not review whether the judgment of the Curia had exceeded the limits of
constitutionality. Rather it would replace the legal opinion of the Curia on the
interpretation of ordinary legislation by its own views, thus becoming a “super
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revision instance” which was not its role under the Constitution. Another judge
expressly confirms the decision of the Curia.
According to Point 5. of the Closing and Miscellaneous Provisions of the Fourth
Amendment of the Fundamental Law of 2013 “Constitutional Court rulings given
prior to the entry into force of the Fundamental Law are hereby repealed.” This
provision should be “without prejudice to the legal effect produced by those rulings.”
So far, this provision has been widely ignored by the Constitutional Court, it
continues to refer to older case law especially where there is identical wording.
However, in its decision 13/2018 there is a separate opinion that strongly argues
against reference to the old Constitution.
These examples should be sufficient to show that the court shows some tendencies
towards formalism and limited reasoning. However, even a Court nominated by one
Government and de facto by one party may show different shadings (“Schattierungen”)
as to judicial independence vis-à-vis the Government. Perhaps this can give an input in
particular for the colleagues from Hungary to discuss possible perspectives with us.
The third step would be to ask whether a dialogue on this issue – be it in legal
scholarship, be it among judges within Hungary, be it on a European level – may
contribute to improvements, whether legal diffusion among EU member states may
contribute to any change.
 V. Resilience and constitutional culture in European
constitutionalism
Resilience can be supported by provisions in constitutions protecting the constitution
from interferences of the constitutional legislator itself. “Ewigkeitsgarantien” or
“fundamental principles” not subject to change are an instrument in this respect.
However, the best rules may not be sufficient if mutual respect between state organs
is lost and with this the respect for the constitution and its core guarantees.
A first concluding remark is therefore dedicated to constitutional culture. In a situation
of constitutional crisis we often find a climate of conflict, sometimes even a climate of
hatred, between competing political forces. During a visit to Warsaw in February 2016
the rapporteurs of the Venice Commission became witnesses of a heated debate
among parliamentarians. A similar déjà-vu occurred to them in the Spanish house of
deputies when discussions were led on the Role of the Constitutional Court in the
Catalan Crisis. Heated debates are nothing unusual in Parliaments. However, they are
a symptom for absence constitutional culture.
The shortest and best way to explain the significance of the role of constitutional
culture is to quote the 2012 opinion of the Venice Commission on judicial reform in
Romania. The Commission held: It “seems that some stakeholders were of the opinion
that anything that can be done according to the letter of the Constitution is also
admissible. The underlying idea may have been that the majority can do whatever it
wants to do because it is the majority. This is obviously a misconception of democracy.
Democracy cannot be reduced to the rule of the majority; majority rule is limited by
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the Constitution and by law, primarily in order to safeguard the interests of minorities.
Of course, the majority steers the country during a legislative period but it must not
subdue the minority; it has an obligation to respect those who lost the last elections."
This statement has expressly been repeated and endorsed in the 2016 opinion on
changes of the Constitutional Tribunal Act in Poland. The Commission then introduces
a “principle of loyal cooperation between the institutions”, already mentioned in the
opinion on Romania. In particular with a view to the disregard of the decisions of the
Polish Constitutional tribunal the Commission held: “A mature understanding of
constitutional institutions is required, which accepts that even after a strong impetus
for political reform, such reform has to remain with the limits of the Constitution and
it is for the competent organ, the Constitutional Tribunal, to decide when these limits
have been overstepped.”
Another feature of lack of constitutional culture is the attack of judges. We have seen
this in the UK in the context of Brexit and a court decision establishing the
participation of Parliament. However, there is a big difference. While the three judges
in London were called “enemies of the people” by a tabloid, harsh criticism of the same
kind and similar wording stem from state organs of the Government side. Judges, and
in particular those sitting in constitutional courts, are not exempt from criticism.
However, personal attacks on all judges or individual judges are clearly inadmissible
and jeopardize the position of the judiciary and the public trust and respect it requires.
Such attacks are in contradiction with the Court’s position as the guarantor of the
supremacy of the Constitution and they are also problematic from the point of view of
the constitutionally guaranteed independence and irremovability of the judges of the
Court.
These observations taken out of the recent practice lead to a theoretical question on
democracy. Modern western constitutionalism is based on the theoretical view that
the requirement of a qualified majority for changing the constitution protects a
minority against changes of law by a simple majority. This has been made clear by
Hans Kelsen in his famous book on democracy: “Wesen und Wert der Demokratie” –
Nature and Value of Democracy. The constitution is a part of the legal order which is
not subject to numerous and quick changes by a simple majority in Parliament, but
rather a rigid body protected by an independent Constitutional Court. Hans Kelsen
argues in favor of a parliament, in which political opponents have the forum to take
decisions after discussions, directed to find a compromise. The aim of the hierarchy of
constitution and ordinary laws is the following: those who are not part of the majority
are protected by the Constitution and by the rights the Constitution confers upon
them. Protection of individuals belonging to minorities, larger minorities as well as
smaller ones, in the framework of a democracy, is the aim of a constitution.
If, as has been the case in Hungary for some years, Government enjoy support by a
two-third majority in Parliament, the mechanism of protection of minorities does not
work. That is why the Venice Commission stated in 2011 in its opinion on the
Constitution of Hungary on the issue of cardinal laws: “The more policy issues are
transferred beyond the powers of simple majority, the less significance will future
elections have and the more possibilities does a two-thirds majority have of cementing
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its political preferences and the country’s legal order.” And it concluded: “When not
only the fundamental principles but also very specific and “detailed rules” on certain
issues will be enacted in cardinal laws, the principle of democracy itself is at risk.”
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